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In the year 2000, exactly one century after the discovery of  quanta, it is very remarkable 
that no change was found necessary in the basic principles of  quantum mechanics, which 
remain the same as when stated in the late Twenties. The situation in interpretation and 
epistemology is still fluid, on the contrary. There is now a trend among philosophers to 
refuse the drastic revision in the philosophy of  knowledge that was thought necessary 
after the work by Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli (and still is in my opinion). Together with a 
few physicists, these philosophers nurture the hope of  seeing a new realistic theory come 
out, although there is no sign of  a complete or consistent one yet. A very different trend 
of  research existing among physicists might be described on the other hand as being both 
pragmatic and theoretical, two characteristics which are apparently opposite and require 
therefore an explanation.
 When I say that our understanding of  quantum mechanics is now completely pragmatic, 
I mean that every concept in it, either important or tiny, is not only appreciated as a 
building block in a grand construction, but as an individual piece of  knowledge expressing 
directly the results of  some specially dedicated experiments. The present experimental 
techniques are so powerful that the investigation of  an aspect or another of  the quantum 
world has become a most enjoyable testing ground for the tools at our disposal. The 
paradigm of  this approach goes back presumably to the experiment that was performed 
in 1982 by Alain Aspect for checking Bell’s inequalities and resulting in an evidence for 
entangled states1. The emphasis has slightly changed however. Whereas John Bell asked a 
deep question, more akin to the structure of  our understanding than anything else (such as 
locality or a causality hidden in hidden variables)2, the experimental result is now more or 
1.   A. Aspect, P. Grangier, G. Roger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 47, 460 (1981).
2.   J. S. Bell, Physics 1, 195 (1964).
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less taken as meaning: “Never mind philosophical issues. Just think as Nature lets you to 
do it by giving you plain facts”. The number of  plain facts confirming quantum concepts 
and resulting from smart experiments has now tremendously increased and all of  them, up 
to now, are in essential agreement with the Copenhagen rules.    
 When one tries to catch more of  the spirit of  this time (l’esprit du temps) among 
the majority of  physicists, one does not always find them full adepts of  the Copenhagen 
philosophy, in spite of  their acceptance of  the practical Copenhagen rules. The real existence 
of  wave packet reduction, for instance, is often considered as remaining more or less an 
open question ; the gap between classical and quantum physics and between determinism 
and probabilism, is considered as somewhat less important than their correspondence, 
particularly in the case of  quantum-behaving macroscopic systems or mesoscopic ones3.
 So, clearly, the present episteme is pragmatic. But it is also systematically theoretical. 
Theoreticians accept readily the basic principles of  quantum mechanics, with no 
reservation, because these principles have withstood a tremendous widening of  their 
range when  extended from atoms to the standard model of  particles, and without a 
hint of  weakness. These basic laws and concepts consist of  the Hilbert space framework 
incorporating non-commuting physical quantities, of  a law for dynamics resulting from 
the Schrödinger equation and a few more assumptions among which relativistic invariance 
and the existence of  identical particles are the main ones, since they are essential for the 
existence of  quantum fields. Similarly, since a few decades, interpretation has also become 
more and more a topic of  theoretical research, where one tries to extract from the basic 
principles themselves some new consequences allowing to deepen their understanding. 
Theoretical work or, essentially, mathematical investigation becomes accordingly some 
sort of  a required preliminary before any further philosophical reflection.
 I thought that such a brief  description of  the state of  research would be useful when 
speaking to a majority of  philosophically-trained people as we are here, if  only because it 
is so different from the approach you may be used to. We shall see together however that 
philosophical questions are like the heads of  the famous Hydra, always poking them from 
new unexpected directions.
 The main pioneer of  the present spirit among the founding fathers of  quantum 
mechanics was certainly John von Neumann. Although he worked at a time when 
speculations, research programmes and personal convictions were not considered as 
suitable for publication, there is little doubt that he did not accept the double talk of  using 
sometimes a classical language and sometimes a quantum one in the statement of  physical 
laws. He does not seem either to have had much respect for the complementarity principle, 
probably too Hegelian for a logician such as him. 
As a matter of  fact, von Neumann began his career by doing research in logic, with the 
3.   J. Clarke, A. N. Cleland, M. Devoret, D. Esteve, J. M. Martinis, Science 239, 992 (1988).
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foundations of  set theory, and his later work on the logic of  computers is well known. It 
may be mentioned that he belonged to the school of  thought headed by Hilbert, according 
to whom theoretical physics should rely on well-formulated basic axioms and then 
consist of  their rigorously derived consequences. The famous book by von Neumann, 
Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, was a powerful attempt at satisfying 
these exacting requirements and one may remember how he pointed there Hilbert spaces 
as the right framework for quantum concepts, while improving considerably for that 
purpose the theory of  operators.
 Another important idea in that book was to define a proposition, a statement expressing 
a physical property of  a quantum system, by “elementary predicates” according to which 
“the value of  some observable A lies within a range Æ of  real numbers at a time t”. 
Indeed, it turns out that every statement concerning a quantum event can always be 
expressed by such a predicate. Furthermore, one can always translate the statement into 
the language of  mathematics by associating it with a definite “projection operator”, namely 
the mathematical operator projecting a state vector on a Hilbert subspace (consisting of  
the eigenstates of  the operator A(t) with an eigenvalue in the range Æ). An important 
consequence of  this construction is to subject the logic of  quantum properties to the 
rigor of  mathematics, a paradigm to which von Neumann later gave another expression 
with the logic of  computers. In both cases, there is emphasis on the Aristotelian principle 
according to which a proposition can only have two possible values: “true” or “false”. 
In a computer, this is obtained by assigning the value of  a proposition to some memory, 
which can either withstand a standard voltage for “true”, or a zero voltage for “false”. In 
quantum mechanics, a projection operator has the same two-valuedness since it can only 
have two eigenvalues, 1 or 0.
 With his projection operators, von Neumann had discovered something essential for 
the understanding of  quantum mechanics, namely a language that could bridge the gap 
between the intuition of  a pragmatic physicist (and also, why not, of  a philosopher) and the 
formal requirements of  a mathematician, since the concepts and laws of  quantum physics 
can only be fully stated in mathematical terms. When however his book was published, the 
readers were much more impressed by three failures he had met, all of  them of  course duly 
acknowledged. One of  these great difficulties was the prediction of  macroscopic quantum 
interferences in the final state of  a quantum measurement device, a result appearing in the 
last two pages of  the book offering a quantum model for a measurement. This remark 
was later to become famous when explained by Schrödinger with the example of  his 
unforgettable Cat.
 There were two other difficulties, one of  them with classical physics. Classical properties 
do not only state for instance that the position of  a particle lies in some range of  values, 
but that the position and the velocity of  some macroscopic part of  an apparatus can be 
assigned simultaneously some values, even with large enough errors allowing a minimal 
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violation of  the uncertainty relations. Although he made a nice try at it, von Neumann was 
not able to associate a projection operator with a classical property and his predicates could 
not be therefore considered at that time as providing a universal language for physics. 
 The last difficulty had to do with logic. If  all the possible predicates, or all the possible 
projectors, express so many sensible propositions, then it is impossible to define the 
basic logical operations (not, and, or) and the corresponding relations (equivalence and 
inference) while satisfying the standard rules of  logic. For a long time, this difficulty 
generated a trend of  thought according to which the logic of  quantum mechanics might 
be non-standard. Finally,. it seemed that von Neumann’s language for quantum mechanics 
was neither universal nor convincingly sensible, which is why it did not much influence 
interpretation for a long time.
 Though rather old, this story remains certainly the best introduction to more recent 
research. It was first seen negatively: three outstanding difficulties stood on the way of  
a deductive interpretation of  quantum mechanics. They looked so insuperable that von 
Neumann himself  proposed almost incredible solutions, such as leaving to consciousness 
the burden of  removing macroscopic superpositions. He also considered seriously the 
possibility of  non-standard logic as a key to the understanding of  quanta4. With hindsight, 
these somewhat desperate attempts show that the difficulties were really non-trivial but, 
from a positive point of  view, it can also be said that they were well-defined problems, 
which held the key for a deeper interpretation. 
 The theoretical approach to interpretation has led to answers for the three von 
Neumann problems in the last two decades or so. For macroscopic interferences, the 
name of  the answer is “decoherence”. The precise derivation of  classical physics from the 
quantum principles was obtained by three different methods using either “coarse graining” 
5, “coherent states” 6 or a newcomer in mathematics known as “microlocal analysis” 7; 
it shows explicitly how classical determinism is a consequence of  probabilistic quantum 
laws. Finally the problem of  logic was solved by introducing  “consistent histories” 8, in 
which the propositions describing physical properties are not single predicates but so-
called histories. When put together, the three answers lead easily to a completely deductive 
interpretation of  quantum mechanics, in which the basic principles are enough for 
generating their own interpretation9. The usual rules of  measurement theory for instance 
become so many theorems.
4.   G. Birkhoff, J. von Neumann, Ann. Math. 37, 818 (1936).
5.   M. Gell-Mann, J. B. Hartle, in Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information, W. H. Zurek 
(edit.), Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1991).
6. K. Hepp, Comm. Math. Phys. 35, 265 (1974)
7. R. Omnès, J. Stat. Phys. 57, 357 (1989) ; J. Math. Phys. 38, 697 (1997).
8.  R. G. Griffiths, J. Stat. Phys. 36, 219 (1984).
9. R. Omnès, Understanding Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press (1999).
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 My purpose in the present talk is not however to describe this interpretation in detail, 
because it would be too long, but to identify the new philosophical problems one is left with 
at the end. The most important new item is certainly decoherence. I shall not try to describe 
it technically, but only mention the essential ideas. When considering a macroscopic object, 
we perceive only some obvious collective degrees of  freedom describing for instance the 
position and the shape of  its various parts. We should not forget however that the object 
itself  (for instance a detector) contains typically billions of  billions of  billions other degrees 
of  freedom for all the atoms in it. The degrees of  freedom of  an external environment 
(atmospheric molecules around the object or photons in the surrounding light) can also 
play a role at the quantum level and, globally, it has become conventional to call the formal 
subsystem containing all these degrees of  freedom (internal and external) the environment. 
The accessible (collective) degrees of  freedom one can directly perceive and measure label, 
from a formal standpoint, another subsystem, both abstract mathematically and obvious 
empirically. The whole object is therefore considered formally as made of  two systems, 
one we can see and one we cannot control in detail.
 You may remember that Heisenberg already considered the environment (without the 
name) as opening a possible way out of  the cat problem. This possibility has now been 
investigated in some detail and, basically, the following schedule is found: The two systems 
(collective and environment) are coupled. They can exchange energy as we know from the 
existence of  friction and dissipation, so that a part of  the total hamiltonian must connect 
them, couple them. Now I suppose that you do not easily envision a complex wave function 
of  the environment depending on so many billions of  variables no more than I do, but 
let us say that it is very complicated and, most importantly, extremely sensitive to the 
external coupling. When a wheel turns even so slightly in a clock, what it provokes in the 
environment wave function is a cataclysm: atoms move, electrons are shaken and phases, 
which are the most sensitive and delicate features of  a wave function, change practically at 
random.
 Suppose now that the wheel belongs to a measuring device, guiding for instance a 
voltmeter pointer whose position will indicate the actual result of  a measurement. What 
happens ? According to Schrödinger and his cat or von Neumann and his mathematics, 
the final wave function of  the measuring device is a sum of  two terms, one indicating, 
say, that the pointer did not move and another according to which the final position of  
the pointer has turned by 90 degrees, indicating that something has been detected. But in 
fact, these two parts of  the wave function are very different. Already when the wheel was 
beginning to move, the environment wave function, with its many billions of  variables, 
was behaving very differently for the static wheel than it did  for the moving one. The 
corresponding phases (i.e. a phase for every value of  every variable in the crowd), their 
phases I say had soon lost any hint of  coherence: they decohered, according to a useful 
neologism stamped out by Gell-Mann. 
Ontology Studies 8, 2008  60
 In the example of  the cat, one would say that the wave functions of  the set of  atoms 
inside a live cat and a dead one differ so much in their multitudinous phases that they cannot 
be anything but orthogonal: they do not allow any visible interference at the level of  the 
cat body. The non-existence of  macroscopic interferences which looked so troublesome 
has now an obvious origin: destructive interferences in the environment wave functions 
suppress constructive ones at the atomic level. 
 The theory of  decoherence is of  course more precise than the sketch I just gave 10 11 12. 
As it turns out, decoherence is in fact a special kind of  irreversible process13. It is moreover 
an extraordinarily effective effect, so quick in action that it completely suppressed any 
interference before it could be spotted by an observation. And so, for many years, theorists 
have lived with a solution that no experiment could establish. Who would then believe 
equations when so much is at stake! But fortunately, four years ago, the effect was seen 
at last in an experiment of  quantum optics, where the number of  degrees of  freedom in 
an environment could be made to vary from zero to ten. Interference were then seen to 
disappear, gradually, in exact agreement with theoretical predictions14. Something essential 
is therefore now established. Decoherence exists and it is as much effective as we did 
expect. So much then with physics. The next question should be to consider the kind of  
consequence it has for our understanding of  physical reality 15 16.
 It is certainly not a surprise if  various people have very different reactions to the 
experimental discovery of  decoherence. People believing in Bohmian mechanics do not 
care: they live in a world much above any experimental reach. People who are fond of  
actual reduction mechanisms recognise that decoherence does the job more rapidly and 
completely than any unconventional effect they had proposed for the same purpose. Some 
of  them say that two effects are still better than one.
 What about people who accept quantum mechanics as complete? It is very instructive 
for instance to put together the answers for the three von Neumann problems and draw 
the consequences. There are in fact so many of  them that only a book can give their list 
but I can mention one: It is found that a definite direction of  time comes out from three 
different origins: there is dissipation (with the second principle), decoherence (!) and also 
logic (leaving aside the cosmological direction of  time). As far as logic is concerned, some 
histories for a quantum system make sense with standard logic with one direction of  time 
but they do not with the opposite direction, when the film of  events is run back. These 
10. W. H. Zurek, Phys. Rev. D 26, 1862 (1982).
11. A. O. Caldeira, A. J. Leggett, Physica A 121, 587 (1983).
12. E. Joos, H. D. Zeh, Z. Phys. B 59, 229 (1985).
13. R. Omnès, Phys. Rev A 56, 3383 (1997).
14. M. Brune et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 4887 (1996).
15. R. Omnès, Understanding Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press (1999).
16. R. Omnès, Philosophie de la science contemporaine, Gallimard (1994), English translation by A. 
Sangalli with additions in Quantum Philosophy, Princeton University Press (1999).
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three directions are furthermore necessarily identical17. There could be a nice Kantian 
echo when this result is expressed as follows: the quantum thing-in-itself  has no specific 
direction of  time but pure reason, i.e. logic, can only give an account of  it by selecting once 
and for all a unique direction. Think of  it: the direction of  time as a categorical a priori 
judgement ! 
Decoherence is closely related with wave packet reduction, but they are not identical. 
Decoherence is a genuine quantum effect occurring inside a measurement device, whereas 
reduction was supposed to affect directly the measured quantum object and was at variance 
with the Schrödinger equation. Their statistical consequences are however identical, 
because decoherence implies that one can compute the probability for the results of  a 
second measurement as if  there had been reduction in a previous measurement (this result 
being most easily shown by using histories). But there was another aspect to reduction. 
It was also supposed to insure the uniqueness of  the measurement result, by selecting 
a single outcome among various possible ones ; it explained, or at least it preserved the 
uniqueness of  reality by an actualising one possibility among many. Decoherence on the 
other hand performs only the first step of  the process. When acting on the environment 
wave functions (or rather on the state operator), it removes superpositions, entanglements, 
and leaves only ordinary, classical, probabilities for the various possible results. Being 
however a quantum effect, it cannot go further and cannot explain how a specific result is 
selected as the actual one.
 It seems at this juncture that we are left again with a very old problem, though now it is 
rather differently stated, a problem one may call that of  actualisation or “objectification”. 
When naively stated, it amounts to the question: is there a genuine effect enforcing actuality 
? Less naively, it becomes much more subtle because one cannot even state it as a problem 
in the framework of  quantum logic. This logic implies, indeed, that the only logically 
consistent histories  are the ones referring to a unique result, whatever it may be, and the 
problem of  actuality asking “which one ?” has no content in the theory. 
 The question (if  not the problem) is made deeper because of  some new powerful 
results. Not only is the theory of  measurement becoming a collection of  theorems, but 
classical logic and even common sense can be deduced from the quantum principles, in a 
macroscopic situation. One may then confidently assert that everything observed has been 
proved to be a direct consequence of  these principles ! Everything ? Well, there is still 
this question about uniqueness for which a genuine probabilistic theory cannot obviously 
provide any cause or mechanism. But if  one asks philosophers what is the most essential 
feature of  reality, they say: uniqueness. This is at least what comes out of  Wittgenstein’s 
games of  language when the apprentice does not understand the word “stone” or “brick” 
and the sole resource of  the master mason is to point out a real stone and say: “that”. 
17. R. Omnès, Understanding Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press (1999).
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“That” is meaningful because and only because “that” is unique. We are thus left with a 
theory agreeing with every feature of  reality, except one, but it is essential. My own belief  
is that we can learn much more about ontology by studying this question deeper, since it is 
a pure case of  the relation between thought and reality, theory and actuality, mathematics 
and physics. One might try of  course to get out of  it through Everett’s many-sheeted 
reality, but it means that one believes quantum theory above the unique wonder of  a reality 
we can contemplate everyday. It looks to me as the extreme of  ideology and I would rather 
prefer bishop Berkeley’s unique dream of  reality by God, if  things have to go that far.
 Let us go back however to less elevated questions. I did not yet mention that decoherence 
is a dynamical effect that is never perfectly exact. Entangled states of  a measured quantum 
object and a measuring device are disentangled, but a tiny amount of  entanglement (or 
superposition) always survives. The probability for observing a macroscopic interference 
effect between a dead and a live cat is never exactly zero, but extremely small and becoming 
exponentially smaller with larger values of  time. As a matter of  fact, very small probabilities 
pop up everywhere in the new interpretation: in determinism, which is a logical equivalence 
between two classical properties holding at different times, and which has always a tiny 
probability for being wrong (because of  gigantic quantum fluctuations) ; in the expression 
of  classical properties, which are always slightly spoiled by the uncertainty relations and in 
other places we can leave out. Borrowing a famous expression from antique philosophy, 
we might say with Simplicius and St Augustine that quantum theory preserves every 
appearance of  reality, except for extremely small probabilities for having them spoiled. 
This is again a question about the exact meaning of  a physical theory, and certainly the 
oldest question of  that sort. 
 One may look more carefully at the question of  very small probabilities. It is often 
said that are negligible, but what is the exact meaning or the precise evaluation of  “very 
small”? We might say: a probability that cannot be checked experimentally, even if  the 
measuring device contained all the matter in the Universe (though excessive, this is at leas 
a “pragmatic” definition and not so crazy when considering that this kind of  probabilities 
always involves an exponential). The next question is then: if  our theory agrees with a 
primary, intuitive, classical experience of  the world through our senses (phenomena), 
except for very small probabilities of  error or misconception, can we neglect safely these 
probabilities and on which ontological grounds? 
 The first person to ask this question was ƒmile Borel, the famous mathematician and 
probabilist. He asked it when thinking of  quantum theory in the late thirties and early 
forties and his answer, which I endorse, can be summarised as such18: An interpretation 
of  probability calculus must be decided before any interpretation of  quantum mechanics, 
18. E. Borel, Valeur pratique et philosophie des probabilités, Gauthier-Villars, Paris (1937) ; Le jeu, la 
chance et les théories scientifiques modernes, Gallimard, Paris (1941).
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since the second theory relies conceptually on the first one. The existence of  too small 
probabilities cannot be falsified by any experiment (in the sense of  Popper’s notion) ; the 
corresponding “strange events” or “miracles” (like the Earth leaving the neighbourhood 
of  the Sun to go revolving around Sirius after a tunnel effect or a dead cat coming back to 
life) are not of  course reproducible and therefore, again, their probability has no scientific 
meaning. Borel went even as far as stating as an “Axiom Zero” of  probability calculus that 
events with too small a probability should be considered as never occurring.
 I do not wish to conclude hastily on the fascinating ontological questions we are now 
discovering with the new data and theoretical results on the foundations of  quantum 
mechanics. Consider how classical concepts are found to emerge from quantum laws ; how 
common sense stands out as a special case of  quantum logic, when applied to macroscopic 
objects and beings ; how causality and locality are found as standard consequences of  
quanta, although they are not universal principles ; how very small probabilities would 
seem to turn reality into an appearance, and nevertheless are so small that unreality does 
not matter ; how quantum theory agrees with everything observed, except for a uniqueness 
that is the very essence of  reality ; how we must therefore reconsider the meaning of  the 
Cartesian project in which all of  Nature is supposed to be mathematically expressed ; 
what are then the consequences for the ontological status of  mathematics ; what could be 
changed and what should remain if  a breakthrough occurred on the frontiers of  quantum 
theory and, most probably, of  general relativity. We need bold and careful philosophers 
for helping us to see more clearly and surely through that wonderful maze. But it cannot 
be done by cooking again the old meal in old pans.
